Nuclear Disarmament and Risks of Proliferation

1. 50 years of nuclear arms race
   
2. Plutonium and uranium for military use
   
3. Illegal traffic of nuclear material
   
4. Nuclear Proliferation
   
5. Nuclear Strategies After The Cold War
   
6. Conclusions
   
7. Footnotes
   

The end of the Cold War coincides with the start of nuclear disarmament that is with a reversal of tendency. But 50 years of arms race can certainly not be erased instantly and without problems. Nuclear disarmament therefore presents itself as being a long and complicated process, in which there are, and will be, no shortage of problems and contradictory aspects, with periods of good progress which will probably alternate with periods of delay and reversal.

Before talking about nuclear disarmament and its relative problems, it may be useful to remember some data which in a synthetic way, even if necessarily schematic, can be chosen to represent these 50 years of nuclear arms race.

• From 1945 to today around 130.000 nuclear warheads have been built of these the United States have built about 70.000 and the USSR more than 55.000;
  
• From the 1960s to the present day two enormous nuclear arsenals have been facing each other, each of which was at all times made up of more than 10,000 weapons. The largest number was reached in 1967 by the USA. (32.500 weapons) and in 1986 by the USSR (perhaps 45.000 weapons);
  
• About 2050 nuclear experiments have been carried out, of which 514 in the atmosphere (or in any case not underground);
  
• The countries in possession of nuclear arms have passed from one (1948) to 8 (today). Of these 8 nuclear countries, 5 declare themselves officially as being so (USA, Russia, Great Britain, France, China) and 3 are "de facto" (Israele, India, Pakistan);
  
• More than 250 tons of plutonium and 2200 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) have been produced for military use;
  
• Apart from the production of nuclear arms, we must remember the production of the relative delivery systems. For example, the United States have produced 67.500 nuclear missiles [1];
  
• The construction and management of nuclear arms and the hundreds of thousands of delivery systems has meant a colossal expenditure for humanity. According to an estimate published in the before-mentioned "Bulletin of the Atomic scientists" the United States alone have spent between 1940 and today the equivalent of about 3900 billion dollars (current 1995 value) for their nuclear programs. This is more than 150 times the cost, actualised, of the Manhattan Project. The USSR has probably spent a similar amount which, together with the expenditure of the "minor" nuclear powers, brings the total nuclear military expenditure to something in the region of nine thousand billion dollars, equivalent to nine times the present annual Italian GNP.

Lastly we must mention the specific social consequences which the nuclear arms race has brought about in the ex-USSR, where the military effort has consumed a far higher quota of national resources than that of corresponding Western Countries. A significant example of the economic and social distortion caused by the arms race was the creation of entire cities closed to the outside world and dedicated to the production of fissile material and other products for nuclear weapons. The total population of these cities is over 700,000 [3].

The production cost of nuclear arms has therefore been very high with regards to the loss of human life, the use of resources, the social imbalances and ecological damage caused. On the other hand the military use of those weapons has been close to zero. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear weapons have never been used in any of the numerous conflicts which have developed during the last 50 years The great variety of nuclear warheads in terms of range of action, of explosive force, of delivery systems and of intended methods of application have not in reality allowed for any real flexibility, since the reasonable conviction that even a limited use of those weapons would have caused a global catastrophe has prevailed. Nuclear weapons therefore represent a unique phenomenon in the history of mankind: never has so much energy been dedicated to the development, the production, and the installation of weapons systems which, for about 50 years, have been accumulated without being used.

2. Plutonium and uranium for military use

To build even a rudimental pure fission bomb it is not necessary to have only weapon-grade type material on hand. Also plutonium with a higher percentage of Pu-240 or uranium with a lower percentage of U-235 can be used for the preparation of a bomb. The International Agency for Atomic Energy in Vienna (IAEA) defines the "significant quantity", from the point of view of the possible illegal manufacture of nuclear weapons, as being 8 kg of plutonium and 25 kg of U-235 contained in HEU (enriched with more than 20% of U-235).

In reality, according to a recent estimate of the Natural Resources Defence Council (NRDC) in Washington DC. a fission bomb could be constructed with an amount between 1 to 6 kg of plutonium and between 3 to 16 kg of U-235 contained in HEU depending on the technical skill of the constructors and the explosive power of the bomb they produce.

If on one hand the quantity of fissile material needed to construct a fission bomb is quite modest, on the other the quantity of Pu and HEU produced by countries which possess nuclear weapons is extremely vast. A recent report by the US. Department of Energy [4] declares that the same DOE bought, between 1944 and 1994, 111.4 tons of plutonium for military use, of which 99.5 tons are still in its inventory. An estimate made by A.S. Diakov [5] establishes that the quantity of plutonium produced by the USSR/Russia up to 1995 is around 126 tons.

With regards to enriched Uranium, the same US. DOE [6] declared that it had produced a total of 994 tons of HEU, of which the amount destined for nuclear weapons has been estimated as being 730 tons, while the corresponding quantity for the USSR/Russia could be anything from 15-30% larger than that of the USA [7]. Following the dismantlement of the nuclear weapons a considerable part of this fissile material has been, or will be, declared "in excess": this regards at least 100 tons of plutonium and 700 tons of HEU.

Apart from fissile material connected with military activity, large quantities of plutonium exist in the fuel and waste of nuclear reactors; in fact this is the greatest part of plutonium in existence. There is then some plutonium of civil origin which has already undergone the process of separation. An estimate made by the American National Academy of Science in 1994 gives the total amount of Plutonium existing in the world in 1992 as being 1100 tons, and foresees that amount will increase in the year 2000 to 1600-1700 tons.

The problems which concern the enormous quantity of fissile material produced are above all those regarding security. The main obstacle which bars the way to the construction of rudimental nuclear weapons is not the access to the necessary technological information, but rather the availability of fissile material. The problem therefore is how to avoid that countries which are interested in buying nuclear weapons or illegal organisations manage to acquire HEU and plutonium.

However, the plutonium contained in the waste of nuclear reactors is very difficult for potential nuclear proliferators to reach since it is not separated from the rest of the radioactive waste. In the same way it is logical to expect that the intact nuclear warheads are difficult to access, because they are protected by military structures [8]. The dismantled warheads and the separated plutonium therefore form the weakest link in the chain of the control system for fissile material. This problem has been brought to the general public's attention with regards to the demise of the ex-USSR and the relative political, economical, and organizational difficulties which have developed in the countries making up the ex-USSR.

The warheads which must be dismantled have a long road ahead of them before they arrive at their "final destination". First of all the warheads must be deactivated (that is the circuits which are in the external part of the warhead must be removed). Then they must be transported to the deposits to which they are destined. At this point the warheads must be opened, separating the fissile material located in a metal container called the "pit" from the rest of the warhead (chemical explosive, secondary system in thermonuclear bombs, etc.). Now the "pit", which contains the plutonium or the enriched uranium is stocked and will be further dismantled only when the final destination of the fissile material is decided.

From the security point of view the process of dismantling a warhead therefore presents the following problems:

• The security of the transport of the de-activated warheads to the deposits;
  
• The tracking of all the warheads and pieces of warheads which are dismantled;
  
• The custody of the "pit" in conditions of security while awaiting the final destination of the fissile material;
  
• The definition of the final destination of the fissile material.

It must be emphasized that the large number of warheads to be dismantled will impose a prolonging of the custody phase of the fissile material in the form of "pits", and that consequently the relative security problems will remain, whatever may be the choice of the final destination for the fissile material.

With regards to the enriched uranium, its logical destination is that of diluting it with natural or impoverished uranium, in this way forming uranium at low levels of enrichment which may be used in nuclear reactors. A similar choice is not feasible for plutonium since the mixing of the different isotopes of plutonium does not eliminate the risk connected to nuclear proliferation. On the other hand, mixing plutonium with other elements (uranium) is a procedure which can be easily reversed carried out by making allowances for the different chemical properties of the elements.

With regards to the destination of the plutonium, among the different choices proposed there are two which are considered to be the best:

1. To consider the plutonium as waste and to keep it in custody indefinitely after having treated it in such a way as to make difficult any access to it. One of the choices is to vetrify it together with a highly radioactive material;
   
2. Use the plutonium for the preparation of MOX fuel (mixed oxides of U and Pu) to be used for civil nuclear reactors.

With regards to the time needed for dismantling nuclear warheads, we can easily realize that the speed of this operation is not very high. It is enough to compare the following data which refers to the USA [9]:

• Average number of American nuclear warheads produced annually in the years 1959 and 1960: more than 7000;
  
• American nuclear warheads dismantled in 1969: more than 3000;
  
• Years in which more than 2000 American nuclear warheads were dismantled per year: 1959, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1969, 1975, 1976;
  
• Average number of American nuclear warheads dismantled annually in the post cold war era (from 1991 to 1995):1550.

• The possible creation of more independent nuclear States among the republics of the ex- USSR;
  
• The prospect of an intense illegal traffic of fissile material or even of whole nuclear warheads;
  
• The possible escape of large numbers of technicians and scientists from the ex-USSR to countries interested in buying nuclear weapons (in Russia there are about 2000 people who have a detailed knowledge of the design of nuclear weapons and around 3000/5000 experts in the production of fissile material[11]).

Up to this moment there is no evidence that significant episodes of recruitment of Russian nuclear scientists have taken place on behalf of countries interested in nuclear proliferation.

Finally, with regard to the episodes of illegal traffic of nuclear material, tens if not hundreds of cases have been reported. Most of these cases have proven, however, to be of dubious authenticity or in any case irrelevant [12]. Only a few significant episodes of nuclear smuggling have been identified (see below). However even in these significant cases the whole picture is not very clear. In particular, even when the fissile material confiscated has been significant and the identity of the thieves established, there is no significant information regarding the possible buyers, whether they be States or criminal organizations.

The following table shows the main episodes of theft of fissile material so far identified. Please note that all the confiscated quantities are a long way from the minimum quantities needed to build a single bomb [13].

The relatively optimistic evaluation made so far regarding the problem of illegal traffic of nuclear material and the overall effects of the disintegration the USSR on nuclear proliferation, must not, however, make us think that the dangers on this front can be considered marginal in the future.

If the situation has been kept (relatively) under control up to now this does not necessarily mean that it will remain so indefinitely, especially in the absence of adequate international initiatives which face up to the numerous problems left to be solved.

With regard to these problems, we must remember some hard facts. The quantity of fissile material present in Russia is extremely high and the systems of protection, control and inventory of nuclear material need significant improvement. The t(illegal) transport of fissile material in quantities which are significant from the point of view of nuclear proliferation can take place with a relatively simple level of precaution, and on the whole fairly easily. In the world there exist countries (or criminal groups) which are, in principal interested in buying nuclear fissile material.

Furthermore in the Russia of today (as in other parts of the world) the illegal or semi-illegal traffic of various commodities is a very widespread phenomenon which does not seem destined to decrease in the near future. The situation regarding Russia's nuclear installations is further complicated by the awful economic conditions in which the technicians and scientists are forced to live especially since not too long ago they benefited from extremely privileged conditions.

Up to now the Russian authorities have shown that they know how to cope with such a difficult and complex situation. The logical reply from the more industrialized countries should have been the development of a comprehensive initiative to support the programs of control for the nuclear material in Russia, accompanied by agreements which made it possible to put together a detailed "nuclear map" of today's Russia, with a list of all the locations, the quantities, the type of pits, the warheads, the parts of warheads. the separated fissile material, and which allowed a system of serious inspection. Another reasonable initiative on behalf of the more industrialized countries would have been that of developing scientific, technological, and economic co-operation with the Russian nuclear research and production structures.

All these initiatives have in fact been carried ahead by the more industrialized countries, but the rhythm has been insufficient, as has also been the commitment, including financial, with respect to the gravity of the situation. The whole affair has been accompanied by political-bureaucratic obstacles of a various nature, in particular with regards to the definition of the agreement concerning the "exchange of information" which is necessary in order to put together the "nuclear map" of Russia, which we mentioned before

The United States, being by far the Western country which has made most commitment, have in five years (from 1992 to 1996) destined an overall sum of about 530 million dollars to programs regarding the problems of the nuclear installations in Russia, which is around 1/300th of their current expenditure for their own military nuclear installations (33 billion dollars annually) [14].

The obvious question is this: for global security, and in particular that of Western countries, is it more important to have a new submarine with nuclear missiles navigating the oceans, or rather to develop initiatives which prevent the transfer of fissile material to terrorist groups or countries interested in buying atomic weapons?

4. Nuclear Proliferation

The scientists who participated in the first phase of the construction of the atomic bomb and several American politicians of the immediate post-war era, thought that , in the absence of an international control over atomic energy, the nuclear weapon would have spread to many countries, even though, in each of these, with levels of quantity very far from the numbers which successively were reached by the superpowers. The number of nuclear countries has instead remained minimal with respect to the initial pessimistic prediction. A true regime of nuclear non-proliferation has been established and has shown notable stability during all these years.

There are five nuclear countries officially recognised as such (USA, Russia, France, Great Britain. China) and there are three nuclear countries not declared (Israel, India, Pakistan). All or almost all the countries in the world, with the exception of the three undeclared countries, have adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This treaty was extended indefinitely in May 1995.

Therefore the first element which has contributed to containing nuclear proliferation is the NPT Treaty, that together with the treaties which establish zones free of nuclear weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tiatelolco), in Oceania (Rarotonga), and more recently in Africa (Pelindaba), provide a clear context of international legislation. Other elements that have contributed to the maintenance of the non-proliferation regime are the significant costs tied to the construction and maintenance of nuclear arms, and the difficulty and cost of the acquisition of fissile material. These last elements become even more important if compared to the evident uselessness of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have never been used in a conflict since the Second World War. Even the simple presence of nuclear weapons has shown itself to be a marginal element in the principal conflicts, local or not, which have developed since 1945. Think of Korea, of Vietnam, of the Falklands, of the Middle-East wars etc. . In recent times a strong push towards the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime has been given by the initiatives for disarmament of the nuclear powers. The dramatic reduction of the emphasis given to nuclear weapons which the USA and Russia followed in the years 87-94, the initiatives for disarmament and the relative treaties, the treaty (in preparation) on the total prohibition of nuclear experiments (CTBT) are all elements which have contributed and contribute to diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in international politics.

Lastly the non-proliferation regime has been benefited by the failure or voluntary abandonment of some attempts at proliferation. South Africa built 6 rudimental fission bombs of the "gun-assembly" type that they successively dismantled. Brazil and Argentina have abandoned their nuclear projects, North Korea has been persuaded to abandon its attempts to buy fissile material for nuclear weapons, and Iraq obliged by force to abandon similar attempts.

Now let us consider the opposite type of motivations, that is the ones that can encourage a country to buy nuclear arms, even in violation of the NPT Treaty. The possession of nuclear weapons has for a long time been associated with a misplaced international "prestige". Possessing nuclear weapons means belonging to an exclusive club of countries, which includes, for example, all the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

Another aspect we must consider is that acquiring nuclear weapons can have contrasting effects on nearby countries: it can frighten them or push them to nuclear emulation. We can understand, however, that a country, surrounded by a hostile environment or one perceived as being such, might think of playing the nuclear card.

Countries considered to be potential proliferators are, for example, those in the Middle East. Among these the name which appears most frequently is that of Iran. In fact the position of Iran on the nuclear problem is not clearly supportive of the non- proliferation regime. Observers, even of different opinions, all agree that Iran could try to buy a sufficient quantity of fissile material for a few nuclear warheads [15].

The more or less obvious tendencies to violate the non-proliferation regime can be influenced by the overall attitude of all the nuclear powers, and of the United States and Russia in particular, regarding nuclear disarmament. If nuclear disarmament proceeds quickly, if the emphasis on nuclear weapons is gradually reduced until it disappears, then the general climate of international public opinion will be less and less prepared to condone nuclear proliferation and the prestige connected to the possession of nuclear arms will be a thing of the past. If instead the disarmament process should slow down, and if the emphasis on the nuclear component of defence should be increased, even only slightly, then the result obtained will be in the opposite direction. As we will see further on, there are various elements which induce us to think that the second hypothesis, the most unfavourable, is the most probable.

5. Nuclear Strategies After The Cold War

A recent estimate [16] has established that 7500 American nuclear warheads (including "reserve" bombs) could be allowed after the actuation of Start II (the ratification of which on behalf of the Russian Parliament, we must remember, presents many difficulties). An equal number of Russian warheads plus the warheads of "minor" nuclear countries brings the total number of warheads to well over 16,000. As many bombs as this will survive after the disarmament which is planned at present.

With regards to the nuclear strategy of the major nuclear powers we observe:

• The American "nuclear posture review" of 1995 does not significantly modify the conditions of use for nuclear arms. It explicitly plans for an increase of operational warheads if the political conditions in Russia should deteriorate;
  
• The American Congress sustains the necessity for a revision of the ABM Treaty and proposes a larger expenditure in the anti-missile defence sector;
  
• Russia has restricted the policy of no-first-use (Not to use for first nuclear weapons) so as to make it practically irrelevant. Russia will not use a nuclear weapon first only against those countries which are not nuclear and that do not belong to organizations which contain nuclear countries;
  
• Russia is making the old NATO doctrine its own on the role of nuclear arms to contrast a possible inferiority in the field of conventional weapons. In particular they speak more and more insistently about a "new" role for tactical nuclear weapons, the removal of which had been announced with unilateral initiatives by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev, but which had never been established by treaty.

Lastly, a question of the greatest importance is the problem of the alert levels of the delivery systems for nuclear weapons. Maintaining a good part of the nuclear systems at maximum alert level was a characteristic of the entire period of the Cold War. This meant that missiles could be launched not after an enemy attack, but simply after the warning that enemy missiles had been launched and were on their way to their targets. A number of the submarines equipped with nuclear missiles were kept in continuous navigation for years, ready to launch their missiles at the shortest notice. Similar levels of alert were kept by nuclear bombers.

After the end of the Cold War, the levels of alert were changed, but only very slightly. Keeping nuclear weapons in "ready-to-use" condition not only continuously presents the risk of a "war by mistake", but also establishes a significant barrier to the development of further nuclear disarmament.

6. Conclusions

The role assigned to nuclear weapons by the super powers still seems to be one of great importance. This not only does not eliminate the risk of a global nuclear conflict, but also has a significant effect on the risks of proliferation. The presence of large quantities of fissile material available for nuclear weapons and the relative problems of the control of this material, could in the future facilitate nuclear proliferation, or the construction of rudimental nuclear weapons by criminal organizations.

Even if the recent progress in the field of nuclear disarmament has certainly been historic, the tasks of the international community with regards to nuclear weapons are far from being finished. The definition of procedures and methods for the total elimination of weapon-grade fissile material and in particular plutonium , is one of the problems to be faced, but it is not the only one. Among the many problems we have discussed there are the ones concerning the control and inventory of existing fissile material, of the further reduction of nuclear warheads (beyond the limits fixed by the current agreements on disarmament), of the reduction of the overall emphasis given to the role of nuclear weapons, of the reduction of the levels of alert. We can also add the involvement of the minor nuclear powers in the disarmament process.

The risk of nuclear proliferation is a complicated one in which many elements merge; general political aspects, local conflicts, ideological aspects and the actual availability of nuclear material. All these aspects will certainly be on the agenda of the international debate in the near future.

Footnotes

[2] T. Cochran, R. S. Norris, O. A. Bukharin:Making the Russian Bomb; Westview Press Boulder Co. (1995)

[3] Yomiuri Shimbun 17/11/1991 cited in M. DeAndreis, F. Calogero:The Soviet

[4] US DOE:Plutonium the First 50 years, Washington DC (Feb 1966)

[5] A. S. Diakov contribution presented at the Como Convention of 18/3/1966 on"Utilization/Disposal of Excess Weapon Plutonium"

[6] Estimate made by T. Cochran in "US Inventoties of Nuclear Weapons and Weapon Usable Fissile Material" NRDC 25/9/1995

[7] See T. Cochran, R. S. Norris, O. Bucharin (above mentioned)

[8] "Difficult to access" does not mean "absolutely impossible to access". In particular the control structure of nuclear warheads is a subject which would merit being discussed at length.

[9] T, Cochran in "US inventories of Nuclear Weapons and Weapon-Usable Fissile Materials" before mentioned.

[10] See G. Allison, O. CotŠ, R. Falkenrath, S. Miller "Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy" MIT Press, 1996.

[11] R. S. Norris in Arms Control Today.

[12] For a complete list of the episodes of nuclear contraband see the report of 20/3/1996 by the Director of the CIA, J. Deutch, to the Permanent Subcommitee on the Investigations of the Commitee of the American Senate on Government Affairs.

[13] The table has been compiled on the basis of information reported by T, Cochran (Conference held at Villa Olmo, Como, 5/7/1995), W. Potter (article which will appear in report on the USPID Convention at Castiglioncello 28-9/1. 10 1995), G. Allison and others b. m.

[14] G. Allison and others b. m.

[15] See for example the contributions on Iran in the report of the USPID Convention at Castiglioncello 28-9/1-10 1995

[16] See R:S:Norris, in the report of the USPID Convention at Castiglioncello 28-9/1-10 1995.