

Prospettive di una NWFZ/WMDFZ in Medio Oriente

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TEATR DRAMATYCZNY
IM. JERZEGO SZANIAWSKIEGO
W WARSZAWIE



Medio Oriente

- denominazione geografica
o entità politica?

- impero persiano
- impero ottomano
- Asia Occidentale



UN subregion of Western Asia

The countries and territories in the [UN Subregion](#) of Western Asia,^[11] listed below:


-  Armenia
-  Azerbaijan
-  Bahrain
-  Cyprus
-  Georgia
-  Iraq
-  Israel
-  Jordan
-  Kuwait
-  Lebanon
-  Oman
-  Palestine
-  Qatar
-  Saudi Arabia
-  Syria
-  Turkey
-  United Arab Emirates
-  Yemen

Though not included in the UN subregion of Western Asia, [Iran](#) is commonly included within Western Asia.^{[1][12]} [Afghanistan](#) is also sometimes included in a broader definition of "Western Asia", although



delimitazione geografica della zona


- ONU 1974: Arabia Saudita, Bahrain, Egitto, Emirati Arabi Uniti, Giordania, Iran, Iraq, Israele, Kuwait, Libano, Oman, Qatar, Siria, Yemen**
- IAEA 1989: Arabia Saudita, Bahrain, Egitto, Emirati Arabi Uniti, Giordania, Iran, Iraq, Israele, Kuwait, Libano, Libia, Oman, Qatar, Siria, Yemen**
- ONU 1990: Algeria, Arabia Saudita, Bahrain, Egitto, Emirati Arabi Uniti, Giordania, Iran, Iraq, Israele, Kuwait, Libano, Libia, Mauritania, Marocco, Oman, Qatar, Siria, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen**



delimitazione geografica della zona

NPT 1995: tutti i paesi della Lega Araba, Iran e Israele

**Algeria, Arabia Saudita, Bahrain, Comore, Egitto,
Emirati Arabi Uniti, Gibuti, Giordania, Iran, Iraq,
Israele, Kuwait, Libano, Libia, Mauritania, Marocco,
Oman, Palestina, Qatar, Siria, Somalia, Sudan,
Tunisia, Yemen**



Lega araba

zone di mare coinvolte

- **per intero**
 - **mar rosso**
 - **golfo persico**
 - **golfo di Aqaba**
- **acque territoriali in**
 - **golfo di Aden**
 - **mediterraneo**
 - **oceano atlantico**
 - **mare arabico**
- **stretti soggetti alla legge del mare (1994)**
 - **di Gibilterra**
 - **di Hormuz**
 - **di Bab al Mandab**
 - **di Tiran**
- **canale di Suez (convenzione di Costantinopoli 1888)**

Stato	governo	popolazione	GNP/ capite \$	religione
Algeria	repubblica semi-presidenziale	36.423.000	6.949	sunniti
Arabia Saudita	monarchia assoluta	27.137.000	23.825	sunniti salafi
Bahrain	monarchia costituzionale	1.235.000	26.852	shi'ai
Comore	repubblica federale	798.000	1.202	sunniti
Egitto	giunta militare	80.801.000	6.354	sunniti/sufi/shi'ai /copti
Emirati Arabi Uniti	sistema federale presidenziale	8.264.000	36.176	sunniti/shi'ai
Gibuti	repubblica semi-presidenziale	864.000	2.554	sunniti
Giordania	monarchia costituzionale	6.407.000	5.956	sunniti

Stato	governo	popolazione	GNP/ capite \$	religione
Iran	repubblica islamica	73.330.000	10.864	shi' ai
Iraq	repubblica federale	34.322.000	3.537	shi' ai/sunniti
Israele	democrazia parlamentare	7.746.000	29.531	giudei
Kuwait	emirato costituzionale	3.566.000	37.848	sunniti/shi' ai
Libano	repubblica parlamentare	4.224.000	15.557	sunniti/shi' ai/ maroniti
Libia	governo provvisorio	6.420.000	13.804	sunniti
Mauritania	repubblica islamica	3.069.000	2.093	sunniti
Marocco	monarchia costituzionale	32.209.000	5.000	sunniti

Stato	governo	popolazione	GNP/ capite \$	religione
Oman	monarchia assoluta	3.609.000	25.438	ibadhi
Palestina	democrazia parlamentare	4.260.000	2.900	sunniti
Qatar	monarchia assoluta	1.697.000	88.588	shi'ai
Siria	stato socialista	22.458.000	5.043	sunniti/shi'ai
Somalia	governo di colizione	9.359.000	600	sunniti
Sudan	repubblica federale presidenziale	30.894.000	2.577	sunniti/shi'ai/ animisti/ cristiani
Tunisia	repubblica presidenziale	11.245.000	9.026	sunniti/ibadhi/ sufi
Yemen	repubblica presidenziale	23.580.000	2.457	sunniti/shi'ai

Stato	Stato	Protocollo di Ginevra	BTWC	CWC	NPT	CTBT	Africa NWFZ
	Algeria	•	•	•	•	•	•
	Arabia Saudita	•	•	•	•	—	
	Bahrain	•	•	•	•	•	
	Comore	—	—	—	•		—
	Egitto	•	—	—	•	—	—
	Emirati Arabi Uniti	•	•	•	•	•	
	Gibuti	—	—	—	•	•	—
	Giordania	•	•	•	•	•	
	Iran	•	•	•	•	—	
	Iraq	•	•	•	•	—	
	Israele	•	—	—	—	—	
	Kuwait	•	•	•	•	•	
	Libano	•	•	—	•	•	
	Libia	•	•	•	•	•	•
	Mauritania	—	—	•	•	•	•
	Marocco	•	•	•	•	•	—
	Oman	—	•	•	•	•	
	Palestina						
	Qatar	•	•	•	•	•	
	Siria	•	—	—	•	—	
	Somalia	—	—	—	•	—	—
	Sudan	•	—	•	•	•	—
	Tunisia	•	•	•	•	•	—
	Yemen	•	•	•	•	—	

Frazione del GNP in spese militari

Stato / anno	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Algeria	2,8	2,6	2,9	3,0	3,8
Arabia Saudita	8,0	8,3	9,2	8,0	11,2
Bahrain	3,6	3,4	3,2	3,0	3,7
Egitto	2,9	2,7	2,5	2,3	2,1
Emirati Arabi Uniti	5,6	5,1	5,0	5,5	7,3
Gibuti	6,3	6,4	4,1	3,7	
Giordania	4,8	4,8	6,1	6,3	6,1
Iran	3,3	3,4	2,5	1,8	
Iraq	2,6	2,7	2,9	5,3	5,4
Israele	7,6	7,6	7,1	6,9	6,3
Kuwait	4,3	3,6	3,6	3,0	4,4
Libano	4,4	4,5	4,6	3,9	4,1
Libia	1,4	1,0	0,9	1,2	
Mauritania	3,7	3,0		3,4	3,8
Marocco	3,4	3,3	3,2	3,3	3,4
Oman	11,8	11,0	10,3	7,7	9,7
Qatar	2,5	2,1	2,2	2,3	
Siria	5,1	4,4	4,1	3,8	4,0
Sudan	4,4	4,4			
Tunisia	1,6	1,6	1,4	1,4	1,3
Yemen	4,3	3,6	4,1	3,9	
Germania	1,4	1,3	1,3	1,3	1,4
Italia	1,9	1,8	1,7	1,8	1,8

The Global Peace Index

Stato / anno	2008	2009	2010	2011
Algeria	2378	2212	2277	2423
Arabia Saudita	2357	2167	2216	2192
Bahrain	2025	1881	1956	2398
Egitto	1987	1773	1784	2023
Emirati Arabi Uniti	1745	1667	1739	1690
Giordania	1969	1832	1948	1918
Iran	2341	2104	2202	2356
Iraq	3514	3341	3406	3296
Israele	3052	3035	3019	2901
Kuwait	1786	1680	1693	1667
Libano	2840	2718	2639	2597
Libia	1927	1710	1839	2816
Mauritania	2435	2478	2389	2425
Marocco	1954	1811	1861	1887
Oman	1612	1520	1561	1743
Qatar	1694	1392	1394	1398
Siria	2027	2049	2274	2322
Somalia	3293	3257	3390	3379
Sudan	3189	2992	3125	3223
Tunisia	1797	1698	1678	1765
Yemen	2355	2363	2573	2670
media	2299	2175	2236	2337
Islanda/Nuova Zelanda	1176	1202	1188	1148

Israele ha relazioni diplomatiche con:

Egitto, Giordania

È riconosciuto come stato, ma non ha relazioni diplomatiche con:

**Ciad, Gibuti, Marocco, Mauritania,
Oman, Qatar, Tunisia**

Non è riconosciuto come stato da:

**Algeria, Arabia Saudita, Bahrain,
Emirati Arabi Uniti, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
Libano, Libia, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen**

Zona denuclearizzata

- iniziativa locale, riconosciuta universalmente**
- riduce la proliferazione nucleare sia orizzontale che verticale**
- pone limiti ai movimenti delle potenze nucleari**
- riduce le tensioni interne alla zona**
- crea un forum di incontro e discussione su tutti i problemi dell'area**
- lancia collaborazioni e cooperazione economica, culturale e scientifica**
- favorisce disarmo per armi chimiche, biologiche e convenzionali**

UN “Comprehensive Study on the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All its Aspects” (October 8, 1975):

- 1. NWFZs may be established not only in entire continents or large geographical regions, but also by smaller groups of states and even individual countries;**
- 2. The zone must be effectively free of all nuclear weapons;**
- 3. The initiative for creating a NWFZ should come from states within the region concerned and participation must be voluntary;**
- 4. All militarily significant states should be members of the zone in order to enhance its effectiveness;**
- 5. The zone must contain an effective system of verification to ensure full compliance with the agreed obligations;**

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

6. Arrangements for a zone should promote the economic, scientific, and technological development of the members through international cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
7. The treaty establishing the zone should be of unlimited duration
8. The constitutive instrument of a NWFZ must be an internationally binding treaty;
9. The geographic zone of application must be clearly defined;
10. The NWFZ must be recognized as such by the General Assembly.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

62. With respect to such zones, the nuclear-weapon States in turn are called upon to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated with the competent authority of the zone, in particular:
- a) To respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone;
 - b) To refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the states of the zone.

Rapporto A/54/42 (1999) della Commissione disarmo dell'ONU: una NWFZ deve

- contribuire al regime internazionale di non proliferazione, alla pace e sicurezza mondiali;
- originare dalla regione stessa;
- venir approvata dalla comunità internazionale;
- includere nei negoziati istitutivi tutti i paesi della regione;
- venir rispettata da tutte le parti e dai paesi esterni alla regione, incluse le potenze nucleari (NWS);
- coinvolgere nei negoziati i NWS per facilitare la loro approvazione;
- coinvolgere nei negoziati i paesi con territori nella regione;
- prendere in considerazione le caratteristiche specifiche della regione;
 - riaffermare l'impegno delle parti al rispetto dei trattati internazionali rilevanti;
 - essere legalmente vincolante;
- essere consistente con la legislazione internazionale, compresa la convenzione ONU sulla legge del mare;

- concedere agli stati parte di poter decidere liberamente se permettere a navi e aerei stranieri di visitare i propri porti e aeroporti e transitare per le acque territoriali;
- venir resa effettiva dalle parti in accordo con le procedure costituzionali individuali;
- proibire lo sviluppo, manifattura, controllo, possesso, test, stazionamento o trasporto da parte delle parti di ogni tipo di congegno nucleare esplosivo, nonché lo stazionamento nella zona di qualsiasi ordigno nucleare esplosivo;
- prevedere delle forme efficaci di verifica del rispetto degli obblighi pattizi per mezzo degli accordi estesi di salvaguardia della IAEA;
- demarcare chiaramente la zona, in consultazione con gli stati parte e altri paesi interessati;
- essere accettata dai NWS, che devono impegnarsi per garanzie di sicurezza negative (NSA), ossia di non usare o minacciare l'uso di armi nucleari contro gli stati parte;
- non impedire l'uso dell'energia nucleare a scopi pacifici.

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

*Opened for signature at Mexico City on 14 February 1967;
entered into force Amendments in 1990, 1991 and 1992
Depositary Mexican Government*

Parties to the original treaty 33

Amendments ratified 22

Parties to Additional Protocol I: France, Netherlands, UK, USA

Parties to Additional Protocol II: China, France, Russia, UK, USA

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)

*Opened for signature at Rarotonga, Cook Islands,
6 August 1985; entered into force on 11 December 1986;
depositary Director of the Pacific Islands Forum
Secretariat*

Parties 13

Parties to Protocol 1: France, UK;

signed but not ratified: USA

Parties to Protocol 2: China, France, Russia, UK;

signed but not ratified: USA

Parties to Protocol 3: China, France, Russia, UK;

signed but not ratified: USA

Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)

*Signed at Bangkok on 15 December 1995;
entered into force on 27 March 1997;
depositary Thai Government*

Parties 10

Protocol: no signatures, no parties

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)

*Signed at Cairo on 11 April 1996; in force 15 July 2009
depository Secretary-General of the African Union*

Ratifications deposited 28

Signed but not ratified 24

**Protocol I: ratifications deposited: China, France, UK;
signed but not ratified: Russia, USA**

**Protocol II: ratifications deposited: China, France, UK;
signed but not ratified: Russia, USA**

Protocol III: ratifications deposited: France

Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk)

*Signed at Semipalatinsk on 8 September 2006; in
force 21 March 2009
depositary Kyrgyz Government*

**Ratified: Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan**

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status of Mongolia


Declared: 25 September 1992

Entered into Force: 3 February 2000

Treaty Obligations:

An individual, legal person or any foreign State shall be prohibited on the territory of Mongolia from committing, initiating, or participating in the following acts or activities relating to nuclear weapons:

- 1) developing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring, possessing, or having control over nuclear weapons;**
- 2) stationing or transporting nuclear weapons by any means;**
- 3) dumping or disposing nuclear weapons-grade radioactive material or nuclear waste.**



Antarctic Treaty

Signed in Washington on 1 December 1959
Entered into force in 1961

Signatory States: 12

Party States: 47

Consultative parties: 28

**frutto della collaborazione scientifica per
l'anno mondiale della geofisica**

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)

Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington, DC, on 27 January 1967

Entered into force on 10 October 1967

Depositaries UK, Russia and USA

Parties 108 Signed not ratified 27

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof (Seabed Treaty)

*Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington on 11 February 1971
entered into force on 18 May 1972
depositaries UK, Russia and US governments*

Parties 97 Signed not ratified 20

NWFZ in Medio Oriente

1962 – prima proposta da un gruppo di intellettuali israeliani

1963 – proposta egiziana all'ONU

WMDFZ in Medio Oriente

1990 – proposta di Mubarak

NWFZ e WMDFZ in Medio Oriente

le due iniziative convivono nell'universo diplomatico sviluppandosi in cinque contesti

- a livello globale
 - ONU, in particolare UNGA
 - IAEA
 - NPT
- a livello regionale
 - processo di Madrid
 - processo di Barcellona

The UNGA context from NWFZ to WMDFZ

1974 – The United Nations General Assembly approves resolution endorsing the goal of establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East following a proposal by Iran-Egypt.

Elements of the Iranian/Egyptian initiative:

- The ME countries should not produce or seek to obtain nuclear weapons.**
- Nuclear weapon states should not use weapons of mass destruction against other countries in the region.**
- The immediate establishing of safeguards for nuclear and non-nuclear weapons.**
- Egypt warned that should Israel obtain nuclear weapons, it would not fail to take action in the face of this serious threat to Egypt's national security.**

The UNGA context from NWFZ to WMDFZ

1980 – Israel joins international consensus allowing the General Assembly to pass a resolution supporting the goal of NWFZ without a vote.

In support of a NWFZ in the Middle East, Israel affirmed that it would represent “a desirable further step towards a just and durable peace in the region. Negotiations, leading ultimately to the conclusion of a formal agreement between all the States of the region, are the only means by which a nuclear weapon-free zone can be established”.

1988 – Resolutions 4365 The General Assembly:

- *Requests* the Secretary-General to undertake a study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon- free zone in the Middle East, taking into account the circumstances and characteristics of the Middle East, as well as the views and the suggestions of the parties of the region.

1990 – The UN Secretary General releases a “study on Effective and Verifiable Measures which Would Facilitate the Establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East” outlining the question of geographical delimitation and introducing the principle that a NWFZ “should be preceded by confidence-building measures”.

Following the use of chemical weapons in the Iran–Iraq War from 1980 to 1988 and the suspicions of an Iraqi nuclear programme, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak declared in April 1990 that Egypt was in favour of installing a WMDFZ in the Middle East:

- 1. All weapons of mass destruction, without exception, should be prohibited in the Middle East, namely nuclear, chemical, biological, etc.**
- 2. All States of the region, without exception, should make equal and reciprocal commitments in this regard.**
- 3. Verification measures and modalities should be established to ascertain full compliance by all States of the region with the full scope of the prohibitions without exception.**

1991 – Security Council resolution 687

- Recalling the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,**
- Conscious of the threat that all weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security in the area and of the need to work towards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of such weapons,**
- Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:**
 - (a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities related thereto,**
 - (b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and related major parts and repair and production facilities,**
- Notes that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs above represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons.**

Israeli votes on Middle East NWFZ

2004 CD e UNGA first Committee

Israel joined the consensus on resolution A/C.1/59/L8 entitled "The Establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East" as it has done for over twenty years

2007 CD

Israel has once again joined the consensus on resolution L1 entitled "The Establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East"

Israel supports the eventual establishment of a mutually verifiable NWFZ in the Middle East that should also be free of Chemical Biological weapons as well as ballistic missiles.

Israel believes that the political realities in the Middle East mandate a practical step-by-step approach. This should begin with modest CBM's followed by the establishment of peaceful relations and reaching reconciliation, and possibly, complemented by conventional and non-conventional arms control measures.

This process could eventually lead to more ambitious goals, such as establishing a Nuclear Weapons Free zone. Israel believes that such a zone can only be established through direct negotiations between the states in the region, after they have recognize each other and have established full peaceful and diplomatic relations between them.

UNGA Resolutions on the Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,
3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975,
31/71 of 10 December 1976,
32/82 of 12 December 1977,
33/64 of 14 December 1978,
34/77 of 11 December 1979,
35/147 of 12 December 1980,
36/87 A and B of 9 December 1981,
37/75 of 9 December 1982,
38/64 of 15 December 1983,
39/54 of 12 December 1984,
40/82 of 12 December 1985,
41/48 of 3 December 1986,
42/28 of 30 November 1987,
43/65 of 7 December 1988,
44/108 of 15 December 1989,
45/52 of 4 December 1990,
46/30 of 6 December 1991,
47/48 of 9 December 1992,

48/71 of 16 December 1993,
49/71 of 15 December 1994,
50/66 of 12 December 1995,
51/41 of 10 December 1996,
52/34 of 9 December 1997,
53/74 of 4 December 1998,
54/51 of 1 December 1999,
55/30 of 20 November 2000,
56/21 of 29 November 2001,
57/55 of 22 November 2002,
58/34 of 8 December 2003,
59/63 of 3 December 2004,
60/52 of 8 December 2005,
61/56 of 6 December 2006,
62/18 of 5 December 2007,
63/38 of 2 December 2008,
64/26 of 2 December 2009,
65/42 of 11 January 2011

IAEA and a NWFZ in the Middle East

1989 - The IAEA Secretariat issues report titled “Technical Study on Different Modalities of Application of Safeguards in the Middle East.”

1991 – The IAEA General Conference passes resolution on “The Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East” as a necessary step towards the establishment of a NWFZ in the region. The resolution has since been passed annually without objections.

IAEA and a NWFZ in the Middle East

2011 – The IAEA has scheduled a two-day forum in November (21-22) to

- “study the lessons of other regions in terms of the context that prevailed before a NWFZ was considered;
- review existing , multilaterally agreed principles for establishing such zones;
- review the theory and practice of establishing the five existing NWFZ;
- discuss the experience of representatives from the five NWFZs in setting up and implementing such zones;
- and discuss the region in the Middle East in this context.”

Madrid Middle East peace talks

The Madrid Process was launched under the auspices of the US and Russia in the post-Gulf- War context.

In the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) the idea of a NWFZ and a WMDFZ in the Middle East started to take form in a regional context between May 1992 and December 1994, during which time the multilateral group convened on six occasions.

Few direct results emerged from these meetings in terms of a weapon-free zone, but the overarching result of the ACRS group is by no means negligible, particularly in the elaboration of several far-reaching CBMs.

Iran and Iraq were not party to these talks.

Egypt wanted nuclear disarmament on the agenda early on, at least in some tangible form, while Israel insisted on discussing it only at a much later stage in the process, once the parties had already agreed on a solid basis of arms control measures and had established a lasting, reliable peace. Because Egypt was not willing to continue without the nuclear subject on the agenda and Israel was not willing to discuss the issue at this early stage, the talks were suspended.

Nonetheless, these differences of opinion needed to come to light in the context of a forum for negotiation.

It is, however, advisable to note that, for the first time, Israel, its main neighbours, as well as other countries in the region sat down at the negotiating table to address questions of arms control.

The regional framework: the Barcelona Process

The progress made by the Barcelona Process is even more scant, but it confirms the European Union (EU) as a wholly separate actor in the multilateral process.

The Barcelona declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of 27–28 November 1995 seems to have taken up where the Madrid conference left off. The 1995 founding document affirms that the Barcelona Conference participants will endeavour to “pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems. Furthermore, the parties will consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional arms.”

The key regional actors, namely Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, but also Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia endorsed this declaration.

On 13 July 2008, “the Barcelona process: a Union for the Mediterranean” (UfM) was officially launched at the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean.

Paragraph 5 of the Joint Declaration adopted by the 43 participating States at the Summit affirms that the UfM includes a section on the prevention of WMD proliferation: ‘The parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems.’

The institutional implementation of the UfM has been very slow indeed.

EU Seminar to promote confidence building and in support of a process aimed at establishing a zone free of WMD and means of delivery in the Middle East

Brussels 6 and 7 July 2011

1. Session: Regional security

Indicative relevant issues:

- ‡ The regional security landscape**
- ‡ Threat perceptions and full range of security concerns**
- ‡ Proliferation of WMD in the Middle East**
- ‡ Ballistic missiles proliferation in the Middle East**
- ‡ WMD terrorism including by non-state actors**
- ‡ Short range rockets and other conventional threats, including by non-state actors**

2. Session: Regional implementation of non-proliferation measures

Indicative relevant issues:

‡ Accession to, national implementation of, and full compliance with multilateral instruments relevant to a WMD free zone: NPT, CTBT, CWC, BTWC, HCoC. Strengthening of suppliers regimes (NSG, AG, MTCR).

‡ Safeguards System : accession to, implementation of and compliance with the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the IAEA Additional Protocol ; possible strengthening measures

‡ Implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 in the Middle East: progress and obstacles

‡ Strengthening of conventional arms control and suppliers regimes (CCW, UN Register Wassenaar Arrangement)

3. Session: Peaceful uses, energy needs and related issues

Indicative relevant issues:

- ‡ Energy needs and recent developments to meet energy demands
- ‡ Peaceful uses of nuclear energy: multilateral approaches; other possible arrangements in a WMD Free Zone
- ‡ Ensuring nuclear safety and nuclear security standards
- ‡ Access to modern technologies in the non-nuclear field (biotechnology, etc.)

4. Session: Confidence-building measures

Indicative relevant issues:

- ‡ What confidence-building measures can contribute to the prospect of establishing a process leading to the establishment of a WMD free zone in the Middle East?**
- ‡ The experience of other regions in launching a regional security process, and in establishing zones free of WMD**
- ‡ Application of the "Principles and Guidelines" for establishing nuclear weapons free zones, as proposed by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1999 and endorsed by the UNGA Resolution 54/56 of 1999, and other necessary steps to foster the establishment of a WMD free zone, taking into account the need for sustainable peace and security in the Middle East**

5. Session: Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in addressing security and proliferation concerns

Indicative relevant issues:

‡ The European Union role in addressing security and proliferation concerns

‡ Can the EU partnership with the Middle East Countries contribute to a process aimed at establishing a WMD Free Zone in the M.E.?

NPT and WMDFZ in the Middle East

1985 – The NPT Review Conference welcomed the objective of a NWFZ in the Middle East in the final declaration.

1995 – The NPT Review Conference adopts a Resolution on the Middle East calling on states to take practical steps to make progress in the establishment of WMDFZ in the region. Member agreement on resolution was seen as key to securing the indefinite extension of the NPT.

2000 - The NPT Review conference reaffirms the goal of 1995 Middle East Resolution and says that the resolution remains “valid until its goals and objectives are achieved.”

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2006 – The WMD Commission Final Report calls for an intensification of international efforts to establish a WMDFZ in the Middle East.

2010 - The NPT Review Conference endorses five practical steps to make progress towards the goal of establishing a WMDFZ in the Middle East. Action steps adopted include convening a regional conference to discuss the issue in 2012 and appointing a WMDFZ Facilitator.

2010 - The goal of a WMDFZ in the Middle East was the dominant issue in the debates about regional matters during the Conference.

The NPT Review Conference endorses five practical steps to make progress towards the goal of establishing a WMDFZ in the Middle East. Action steps adopted include convening a regional a Conference, scheduled for 2012, bringing together all the Middle East States to address the question of a zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction in the region, with the support of the sponsors of the 1995 resolution, the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom.

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to NPT: the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East

To that end, the Conference endorses the following practical steps:

(a) The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, will convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States. The 2012 Conference shall take as its terms of reference the 1995 Resolution;

(b) Appointment by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, of a facilitator, with a mandate to support implementation of the 1995 Resolution by conducting consultations with the States of the region in that regard and undertaking preparations for the convening of the 2012 Conference. The facilitator will also assist in implementation of follow-on steps agreed by the participating regional States at the 2012 Conference. The facilitator will report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings;

(c) Designation by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, of a host Government for the 2012 Conference;

(d) Additional steps aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 Resolution, including that IAEA, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and other relevant international organizations be requested to prepare background documentation for the 2012 Conference regarding modalities for a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, taking into account work previously undertaken and experience gained;

(e) Consideration of all offers aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 Resolution, including the offer of the European Union to host a follow-on seminar to that organized in June 2008.

Statement by Govt of Israel on NPT Review Conference Middle East resolution 29 May 2010

**This resolution is deeply flawed and hypocritical:
It ignores the realities of the Middle East and the real
threats facing the region and the entire world.**

**As a non-signatory state of the NPT, Israel is not obligated
by the decisions of this Conference, which has no authority
over Israel.**

**Given the distorted nature of this resolution, Israel will not
be able to take part in its implementation.**

US position on a WMD free zone in the Middle East

a comprehensive and durable peace in the region and full compliance by all regional states with their arms control and nonproliferation obligations are essential precursors for its establishment.

The United States will not permit a conference or actions that could jeopardize Israel's national security.

The proposed regional conference, to be effective:

- must include all countries of the Middle East and other relevant countries**
- be a conference for discussion aimed at an exchange of views on a broad agenda, to include regional security issues, verification and compliance, and all categories of weapons of mass destruction and systems for their delivery**
- would draw its mandate from the countries in the region in recognition of the principle that states in the region have sole authority regarding any WMD free zone in the Middle East**
- operate only by consensus by the regional countries, to include agreement on any possible further discussions or follow-up actions, which will only take place with the consent of all the regional countries**
- will only take place if and when all countries feel confident that they can attend.**

Statement by the National Security Advisor, General James L. Jones

Verso la conferenza del 2012

Luglio 2011 - Il diplomatico russo al seminario di Brussels comunica che Canada, Olanda e Finlandia sono i tre paesi candidati a ospitare la conferenza e fornire il facilitatore.

Agosto 2011 - L'ambasciatore egiziano all'ONU Maged Abdelaziz dice che i paesi arabi sono contrari al Canada e hanno riserve sull'Olanda, in particolare per la persona del facilitatore olandese; trovano preferibile la Finlandia anche se il suo facilitatore non ha un sufficiente rango politico l'Austria può essere accettabile.

Si può separare la scelta del paese da quella del facilitatore, anche se è più efficace che siano dello stesso paese. Il punto importante è appunto il facilitatore: non può essere dai paesi nucleari, dalla lega araba, Israele e Iran; deve essere almeno a livello ministeriale; deve essere accettabile da tutti, in particolare Iran e Israele.

Un diplomatico da uno stato del golfo ha detto che non ci sono obiezioni alla Finlandia.

The fact remains that Egypt's interest lies in reinforcing the link between the event and the NPT Review Process.

On the contrary, Israel will only take part in the initiative if the two are clearly dissociated from one another, and on the condition that all WMD should be dealt with, not just nuclear weapons.

According to Israel, attention should be focused on states' interests, security concerns, and on the nature and quality of inter-State relations, and regional stability.

The deterioration of regional relations and the growing concern over Syria and Iran seem to make this approach even more pertinent on the eve of the organization of a conference in 2012.

NPT e la WMDFZ in Medio Oriente

- la Conferenza di Revisione imprime un'accelerazione al processo verso la WMDFZ fissando la scadenza del 2012 per la conferenza preparatoria
- la scadenza del 2012 e l'accoppiamento NPT/WMDFZ può creare problemi per lo stesso NPT se la conferenza non potesse venir svolta dato che la conferenza è uno dei punti qualificanti della Conferenza di revisione, condizione per l'approvazione del documento finale
- la mancata designazione del facilitatore prima del primo convegno preparatorio della conferenza di revisione del 2015 (primavera 2012) può avere gravi ripercussioni sui lavori in vista della nona conferenza di revisione del NPT

alcune osservazioni sui (primi) 50 anni della NWFZ/WMDfZ in Medio Oriente

- aspetti di continuità nei processi diplomatici:**
 - longevità e lenta evoluzione del progetto**
 - permanenza inflessibile delle posizioni degli stati principali**
 - ripetuto uso del progetto come strumento diplomatico da parte dei rispettivi protagonisti per i propri interessi contrastanti**
 - suo impiego strumentale a scopo propagandistico interno ed esterno**
 - progressi e regressi direttamente collegati agli sviluppi del clima strategico e diplomatico della regione**

- aspetti di evoluzione:

- **moltiplicazione dei forum e degli attori coinvolti che si intersecano in vario modo creando momenti di rottura e introducendo novità**
- **ampliamento del progetto e dei suoi obiettivi**
- **crescente precisazione dei termini**
- **coinvolgimento di ricercatori e analisi indipendenti**
- **tendenza al prevalere degli aspetti politici concreti su quelli prettamente diplomatici**

prospettive personali


- i problemi operativi associati alla creazione di una WMDFZ con l'estensione a tutti i paesi della lega araba, Israele e Iran sono [eccessivamente] complessi; tre soli esempi per cui non sono ci precedenti
 - interferenza/sovrapposizione con la NWFZ africana
 - verifica del rispetto dei vincoli relativi alle armi biologiche
 - creazione del regime di controllo dei missili

BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION 2005

19 Countries only have ballistic missiles with ranges under 1,000 km

Afghanistan
Armenia
Bahrain
Belarus
Egypt
Greece
Iraq
Kazakhstan
Libya
Slovak Republic
South Korea
Syria
Taiwan
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
Vietnam
Yemen

Countries of concern with ballistic missiles with ranges over 1,000 km



Strategic Missiles of 5 Declared Nuclear-Weapon States

Country	Missile	Type	Range
China	DF-5A	ICBM	13,000 km
France	M45	SLBM	6,000 km
Russia	SS-18	ICBM	9,000-11,000 km
	SS-19	ICBM	10,000 km
	SS-24	ICBM	9,000-11,000 km
	SS-25	ICBM	10,500 km
	SS-27	ICBM	10,500 km
	SS-N-18	SLBM	6,500-8,000 km
	SS-N-20	SLBM	8,300 km
	SS-N-23	SLBM	8,300 km
United Kingdom	Trident II/D-5	SLBM	7,400+ km
United States	MX Peacekeeper¹	ICBM	9,650+ km
	Minuteman III	ICBM	9,650+ km
	Trident I/C-4	SLBM	7,400 km
	Trident II/D-5	SLBM	7,400+ km

1. To be removed from service by October 1, 2005.

Missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 km in 6 Countries of Proliferation Concern

Country	Missile Name	Range
India	Agni II	2,000-2,500 km
Iran	Shahab III	1,300 km
Israel	Jericho II	1,500 km
North Korea	No Dong	1,300 km
	Taepo Dong I	1,500-2,000 km²
	Taepo Dong II	5,500 km³
Pakistan	Ghauri/No Dong	1,300 km
	Ghauri II	1,500-2,000 km
Saudi Arabia	CSS-2	2,600 km⁴

2. The sole test of the Taepo Dong I flew 1,320 km. Some experts speculate that an operational third stage and reentry vehicle would allow the Taepo Dong I to deliver a light payload over 5,500 km.

3. The Taepo Dong II has not been flight-tested. The 2001 National Intelligence Estimate of the Ballistic Missile Threat speculates that, with a lighter payload, it could have a 10,000-km range.

4. Saudi Arabia purchased CSS-2 missiles from China in 1987 and has never tested them.



*entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter
necessitatem*

William of Occam, inizi XIV secolo

- le trattative diplomatiche in tutti i molteplici contesti vanno perseguite integrandole fra di loro
 - la rigidità delle posizioni contrastanti non è un ostacolo insormontabile ai processi negoziali e soprattutto a una serie di iniziative miranti a creare confidenza reciproca
 - una migliore analisi delle minacce alla sicurezza globale (non solo militare) dei singoli paesi può derubricare il ruolo delle armi degli avversari e portare a misure anche unilaterali efficaci e concrete
- al di là delle intenzioni, la creazione di una zona NWF o WMDF in realtà non potrà essere un prerequisito al miglioramento della sicurezza del Medio Oriente, ma piuttosto un punto di arrivo di un processo di miglioramento della sicurezza globale della zona

